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1. History of Workmen’s Compensation
The principle of systematic compensation for losses due to 
industrial accidents has been applied in some countries of Con­
tinental Europe, e.g., Germany, for nearly eighty years.
Great Britain introduced workmens compensation legisla­
tion in 1897.1 The underlying principle as stated in the first sec­
tion was as follows:
“If in any employment to which this Act applies personal 
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employment is caused to a workman his employer shall 
. . .  be liable to pay compensation . . . ”
Other parts of the British Commonwealth followed quickly, New 
Zealand passing her first Compensation Act in 1900,2 until all 
the British Commonwealth legal jurisdictions were applying Acts 
similar to the Act in Great Britain. The first Compensation Act 
in Canada appeared in 1902,3 with Australia following shortly 
after. Agitation in the United States for workmen’s compensa­
tion legislation began in about 1902 but was met with consider­
able opposition and it was not until 1911 that ten States success­
fully introduced Workmen’s Compensation Acts.4
The first New Brunswick Compensation Act was passed in
1903.5
All of those early Acts were based on a principle of em­
ployers liability which some retain to this day. At first those
•The following substantially reproduces a talk delivered as part 
of a symposium arranged by the Faculty of Law of the Uni­
versity of New Brunswick at the Mid-Winter Meeting of the 
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at Fredericton, N. B., February 10 and 11, 1961.
tD aniel M. Hurley, B.A. (St. Thomas), B.C.L. (U.N.B.), L.L.M. 
(London), of the Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick.
1. Workmen’s Compensation Act (1897), 60 Viet., c. 37.
2. See Macdonald’s Worker’s Compensation in New Zealand, 
2nd. ed., (1934).
3. Workmen’s Compensation Act (1902), Statutes of British 
Columbia, c. 74.
4. See Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Laws, vol. 2.
5. Employers’ Liability Act, (1903) 3 Edw. VII, c. 11.
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Acts simply provided that employers were liable to pay com­
pensation to their workmen injured under certain conditions 
regardless of negligence on the part of employer or employee. 
And they abolished the common law defences of common em­
ployment, voluntary assumption or risk, negligence of fellow 
servant and contributory negligence. Later some acts required 
that employers cover their risks by insurance.
The first Compensation Acts in Canada were the employers 
liability type acts. But the evolution was fast, and beginning 
in 1914 in Ontario the Provincial Compensation Acts began 
providing for a system of State insurance. The basis of these 
Acts was similar to the German system of accident insurance 
and a collective liability scheme used in some of the United 
States of America. All the provinces in Canada, except Saskat­
chewan, have now adopted a similar type of social insurance 
scheme. However, none of these Acts nave develope to the 
complete social insurance scheme adopted in the United King­
dom in 1948 under the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) 
Act, 1946.
The first New Brunswick Act of this type was passed in
1918.6 Our present Act has undergone no basic change since 
that time.
When cases based on Workmen’s Compensation Acts first 
reached the Courts those Acts were interpreted in the light of 
tort rules. But as the Acts developed such rules were found to 
be inapplicable. In search of more appropriate rules the Courts 
turned readily to long familiar contract rules, which were found 
to be equally inappropriate.
This development by the courts in the United States was 
described by Horovitz as follows:
“In early cases the Courts tended to be strict, . . .  a later 
trend was to construe broadly and liberally . . . present 
Courts refuse to follow the older narrow cases.
. . .  As one of the purposes of Workmens Compensation 
was to keep injured workers from becoming public 
charges, a reasonable, liberal and practical construction 
is preferable to a narrow one, and that these acts are for 
the giving of compensation, not for the denial thereof.
. . .  It is insurance of a social character and not to be 
administered on narrow common law principles applying 
to other types of insurance. Care must be exercised lest 
long judicial habits in tort cases allow judicial thoughts 
and opinions in compensation cases to be too much in­
fluenced by outmoded or modified factors of decision.”?
6. Workmen’s Compensation Act, (1918) 8 Geo. V, c. 37.
7. Horovitz, Current Trends in Workmen’s Compensation, (1947).
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I suggest that in those words of Samuel Horovitz lies the 
key to the proper interpretation of the present New Brunswick 
Workmen’s Compensation Act,8 which unfortunately appears at 
times to get lost.
2. The New Brunswick Workmen’s Compensation Act
General.
The New Brunswick Workmen’s Compensation Act is divid­
ed into two parts; Part I and Part II.
Part I provides for a scheme of compensation for workmen 
or dependants of workmen who suffer injury or death within the 
scope of their employment in certain industries. It provides for 
a Compensation Board to administer the Act ana adjudicate 
claims.
Part II, which is very short, has nothing whatever to do 
with workmen’s compensation.
Practitioners, however, ought to be keenly aware that by 
virtue of Part II a workman, not entitled to compensation, may 
have a right of action which does not exist at common law or 
otherwise in statutes.
Since Part II is brief I shall consider it first.
Part H.
This part applies to industries to which Part I does not 
apply. This can only be properly understood by closely examin­
ing the definition of “industry” in Part I together with REGULA­
TION 2 to the Act. “Industry”, is defined as referring to, inter 
alia, “part of an industry”. Regulation 2 excludes from the 
scope of Part I any “industry” where not more than a specified 
number of workmen are employed therein. The usual number 
is 2 or 3, although sometimes more, and nearly every type of 
“industry” is listed in Regulation 2. It must be that industry” 
even as defined in Part I, is to be given a very liberal construc­
tion in Regulation 2, so as to bring the small operations (ex­
cluded from the scope of Part I), within the scope of Part II. 
This view is somewnat supported by s. 29(2) authorizing the 
Board to determine whether any operation, undertaking or em­
ployment is an industry.
The provisions applicable to whatever industries, or persons, 
that do come within the scope of Part II are to say the least, 
sketchy. There are two sections, totalling approximately one
8. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 255, as 
amended.
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page. These two sections attempt to codify the common law, 
relating to negligence, and include statutes relating thereto, e.g., 
fatal accidents, and contributory negligence. This is, of course, 
much too ambitious, and as a result I am inclined to think that, 
generally speaking, the Act would be improved by the omission 
of Part II. However, Part II does give a workman within its 
scope a right of action against owners and suppliers of works, 
machinery, etc. as well as their employer, and exempts him from 
the negligence of his fellow employee, i.e., the doctrine of com­
mon employment is abolished. “Lord Abinger planted the 
Doctrine of Common employment, Baron Alderson watered it, 
and the devil gave it increase.”9 It is good to see it decline.
Part I.
Part I of the New Brunswick Workmen’s Compensation Act 
provides for compensation for injured workmen and for the 
creation and administration of a fund from which the compensa­
tion is paid. It is basically a social insurance scheme.
Without retreating into further historical commentary on 
the act it is important to point out that the nature and purpose 
of the New Brunswick Act has been subject to judicial comment 
the effect of which one might, at times, feel is lost in a con­
fusion of technicalities.
In 1918, Mignault, J., in speaking of the New Brunswick 
Act, said:
“The object of the . . . Act was to give to the workman 
a remedy where none could be claimed under the com­
mon law . . . ”io
In 1934, Barry, C.J.K.B., said, inter alia;
“The Workmen’s Compensation Act is a long step for­
ward in social legislation designed to rehabilitate and 
aid in getting injured workmen back to work and to 
assist in lessening or removing handicaps resulting from 
their injuries . . .” 11
How often have such commendable principles been deliberately 
or unwittingly trampled, even to the extent of making the Act 
the instrument by which a workman’s common law or statutory 
rights have been frustrated.
Part I of the Act does not apply to all workmen in New 
Brunswick, but only to those employed in the “industries” listed
9. Hayward v. Drury Land Theater Lid. (1917) 2 K.B. 899, at 
p. 915.
10. C.P.R. v. Cheeseman (1918) 57 S.C.R. 439; 45 D.L.R. 257.
11. Fleck v. Workmen's Compensation Board (1934) 8 M.P.R. 33; 
[1934] 2 D.L.R. 145.
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in sec. 2 read in conjunction with Regulation 2, which excludes 
“industries” employing less than a set number, e.g., 5, 3 or 2. 
However, sec. 2 does contain a large majority of all “industries” 
in tiie province and it is of considerable importance to note that 
since 1959 travelling salesmen appear to come within the scope 
of the Act,12 whicih from a conflict of laws standpoint is of par­
ticular interest. But although a 1955 amendment13 suggested 
an intention to include farm laborers this amendment does not 
appear to have been proclaimed. There are some who might 
feel that agriculture is an important “industry” in this Province. 
However it may be that most farming in New Brunswick is 
carried on by self-employed people. Other industries can, of 
course, be included at any time, even temporarily,14 and there 
does not appear to be any reason Why farm labour groups could 
not be brought within the scope of the Act, without amendment, 
if they so wished.
Assuming a workman is employed in an “industry" within 
the scope of the Act, some particular provisions must be con­
sidered as regards the “compensation” itself.
Compensation is payable to a workman or his dependants 
if he suffers injury or death by accident arising out and in the 
course of his employment in an industry within the scope of 
Part I unless sucn accident was, in the opinion of the Board, 
intentionally caused by sudh workman, or was wholly or prin­
cipally due to intoxication or serious and wilful misconduct on 
the part of the workman and did not result in the death of the 
workman.15
Although the latter part of that provision may be considered 
as a gesture of magnanimity to the dependants of the successful 
suicide, the really drunken or Wholly bad workman it holds little 
consolation for tne unsuccessful suicide, the moderate drunk or 
mischevious person. To reconcile the term “intentionally caus­
ed”, which has appeared in the Act since 1918, in s. 6(1) with 
the definition of “accident” in the 1955 amendment to the Act 
would tax the interpretative skill of the most astute jurist.16
12. An Act to Amend the Workmen’s Compensation Act, (1959)
8 Eliz. II, c. 79.
13. An Act to Amend the Workmen’s Compensation Act, (1955) 
4 Eliz. II, c. 81.
14. The Workmen’s Compensation Act. R.S.N.B., 1952, ss. 3 and 4.
15. Ibid, s. 6(1)
16. "Accident” means an unlooked for mishap or untoward event 
which is not expected or designed. Acts of New Brunswick 
1955, c. 81, s. 1.
U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL 23
The first part of section 6(1) contains terms familiar to any 
student of workmen’s compensation and are to l>e found in other 
Provincial Acts in Canada, State Acts in the U.S.A., in English 
and Australian Acts, and probably others. In all those places 
such terms have given rise to much litigation. Although the 
term “accident” was at first the subject of much controversy it 
has not been so troublesome in more recent years. This is, of 
course, partially due to more studious attempts to define “acci­
dent” in the Acts, and the inclusion of such things as lightning, 
blisters and frostbite, but also to a liberal interpretation by- 
jurists, more in accordance with the spirit than the technicalities 
of the Act. For example, in 1940 the Supreme Court of Canada 
in deciding a case on appeal from New Brunswick Supreme 
Court held soreness whicn developed in a stenographer's back 
from operating a heavy machine to be an “accident” within the 
terms of the New Brunswick Act.17 This kind of decision is, of 
course, to be hoped for, and I suggest is the only possible inter­
pretation consistent with the nature and purpose of workmen’s 
compensation. In so suggesting, I am fortified by the words of 
Richards, J. when speaking of the New Brunswick Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, he said;
“a generous and liberal interpretation should be placed 
on the provisions of the Act and that the acts of those 
who seek the benefits of its provisions ought not to be 
considered in too narrow or technical sense.” 18
Unfortunately such an approach is not to be found in the 
interpretation of other words and phrases in the Act. It would 
appear that the difficulties caused by the words “arising out of 
and in the course of employment,” like the poor, we have always 
with us. Those words nave bedevilled the Courts of the Com­
mon Law world since their introduction in the first English 
Workmen’s Compensation Act in 1897. If we are not convinced 
by the many Canadian cases in which those words were con­
sidered, we need only glance at the reports of workmen’s com­
pensation cases in the United States, England, Australia and 
New Zealand to be certain that those words have been the 
great adversary of the workman and have successfully stoixl 
between him and compensation on numerous occasions. How­
ever, it is not necessary to look beyond New Brunswick cases 
to see the mischief of those words.
In 1934, the New Brunswick Supreme Court decided that a 
C.N.R. employee who was struck and injured by a C.N.R. train 
while taking a short cut along the C.N.R. line to his work was
17. Workmen's Compensation Board v. Theed [1940] S.C.R. 553; 
[1940] 3 D.L.R. 561.
18. Re Goguen (1935) 9 M.P.R. 186; [1935] 3 D.L.R. 104.
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not injured in the course of his employment.19 In reaching this 
decision the Court seemed to find an easy answer by applying 
the seventeen year old case of McMannamin v. R. Chestnut & 
Sons Ltd.,20 rather than consider the Act as a whole. However 
in Workmens Compensation Hoard v. C*P.R. and Noell21 the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that it is now well settled that 
the risks extend to those met while he is entering upon work 
and departing from it.
In 1942, Chief Justice Baxter held that where a woodsman 
took shelter under a tree during a storm and was killed when 
lightning struck the tree there was no claim for compensation as 
he was not acting within the course of his employment.22 Had 
the workman been cutting the tree when lightning struck I sup­
pose a claim would have been allowed.
In that case Chief Justice Baxter applied English precedents 
Which concerned quite different types of Acts. But the Milton 
case is only useful now to indicate that attitude and approach 
of the Courts, as the 1955 amendment expressly includes injuries 
by lightning.23
It might appear that the New Brunswick Supreme Court 
was inclined to adopt a more liberal interpretation in 1951 in 
the case of Workmen’s Compensation Board v. C.P-R. & Noell.24 
But the Supreme Court of Canada effectively blocked any such 
move by reversing the Supreme Court of New Brunswick.25 In 
that case an employee of the C.P.R. was injured while driving 
off a pier at Katy’s Cove. Her contract of employment with the 
C.P.R. contained several requirements, e.g., she was to live at 
the hotel, and extended several privileges, e.g., swimming at 
Katy’s Cove. The Supreme Court of Canada held she was not 
entitled to compensation as her injury did not arise out of and 
in the course of her employment. The test applied by the Court 
was diat “the employee must be where she was eidier in carry­
ing out a duty or under the coercion of the contract or in the 
exercise of conduct diat was intimately involved, as an incident, 
with action in those two spheres.”26 And it appeared to die
19. R. v. Workmen's Compensation Board (1934) 8 M.P.R. 25; 
[1934] 3 D.L.R. 753.
20. (1917) 55 N.B.R. 571; (1917) 37 D.L.R. 302.
21. [1952] 2 S.C.R. 359; [1952] 3 D.L.R. 641.
22. Re Milton (1942) 16 M.P.R. 237; [1942] 2 D.L.R. 329.
23. (1955) 4 Eliz. II, c. 81, s. 1.
24. 28 M.P.R. 271.
25. [1952] 2 S.C.R. 359; [1952] 3 D.L.R. 641.
26. Ibid. at p. 370.
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Court tliat the fact that Miss Noell was allowed to swim in the 
Cove did no make such activity an incident of her work. Clearly 
Miss Noell was not swimming because of a duty nor was she 
coerced by her contract. However, it is difficult to say her 
swimming at that time in Katy’s Cove was not an incident of her 
employment. But the Supreme Court felt such incidents must 
be intimately involved with the employment. It must be re­
gretted that Harrison, J. was overruled. With the greatest 
respect to Bridges, J., who dissented in the New Brunswick 
Supreme Court, I suggest that learned Judge gave far too much 
attention to old English cases which I contend were not appli­
cable to the present New Brunswick Act. However, it appears 
his judgment found favor in the Supreme Court of Canada. How 
the Supreme Court would draw the line between intimately 
involved incidents and those outside the scope of the employ­
ment is difficult to imagine. However, no attempt should be 
made to imagine how the Supreme Court would accomplish 
this until the case of Kennedy v. Workmen’s Compensation 
Board27 has been considered.
Kennedy, together with his truck and tractor, was hired by 
his sons who were carrying on woodcutting operations. Kennedy 
was paid a daily wage. Gas and oil for the truck and tractor 
was supplied by the sons. The tractor was operated by different 
persons including the sons and was broken while being operated 
by one of them. Kennedy was instructed by the son who caused 
the damage to take the tractor to a particular garage and have it 
repaired or get a new one. Kennedy went to the garage as 
instructed and while there decided to get a new tractor. When 
trying it out he was injured. The majority of the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that Kennedy was not entitled to compensation 
as his injury did not arise out of his employment, and applied 
Reed v. Great Western Ry. Co.28 In a minority judgment Rand 
and Cartwright, JJ. thought Kennedy was entitled to compen­
sation and said that;
“in the broad perspective of the circumstances the occur­
rence was caused by the work and in the course of it.”
With great deference I suggest that a worse decision can 
scarcely be found in the field of Workmen’s Compensation.
In Reed v. Great Western Ry. Co.,29 which the Supreme 
Court of Canada purported to apply in the Kennedy case, the 
injured workman was clearly not acting within the course of his 
employment and had been repeatedly warned by his employers
27. [1955] S.C.R. 524.
28. [1909] A.C. 31
29. Ibid.
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not to do the very ac* which caused his injury. Also it must be 
of some significance that the Workmen’s Compensation Act in 
force in England in 1909 was basically different from the New 
Brunswick Act in 1955. I suggest that only the minority judg­
ment of Rand and Cartwright, JJ. can possibly be consistent 
with the nature and purpose of the present New Brunswick Act. 
For those who feel as I do there is some consolation in the 
thought that the Kennedy case would easily be distinguished by 
a Court inclined to do so, but such inclination is unlikely to be 
found in the Supreme Court of Canada.
Before leaving this particular point I should mention that 
little help can be obtained from the presumptions in s. 6(2), 
which reads as follows;
“When the accident arose out of the employment, unless 
the contrary is shown, it shall be presumed that it occur­
red in the course of the employment, and when the acci­
dent occurred in the course of employment, unless the 
contrary is shown, it shall be presumed that it arose out 
of the employment.”
The same result can be obtained by rewording s. 6(1) to read 
“arising out of or in the course of ”
The New Brunswick Workmen’s Compensation Act makes 
a rather limited provision, in a roundabout way, for injuries 
occurring outside the Province. There is little room for argu­
ment that it would extend to injuries outside the territorial juris­
diction unless expressly stipulated. Section 6(3) provides, in 
part;
“When a workman is engaged in work part of which is to 
be performed in this Province and part in an adjoining 
province or country the work shall be considered as done 
and performed in this Province, and the workman or his 
dependants shall be entitled to be paid compensation 
under this Part . . .” etc
This is indeed a strange provision. “Adjoining” is not defined 
in the Act. Clearly the Provinces of Quebec and Nova Scotia 
adjoin New Brunswick, maybe Prince Edward Island could be 
considered as adjoining New Brunswick. Clearly no other Prov­
ince in Canada could be so considered. The State of Maine can 
hardly be considered a country, but dearly the United States of 
America is a country adjoining New Brunswick. So then, a 
workman employed partially in New Brunswick and partially in 
any State of the United States comes within the New Brunswick 
Act, whereas the employee whose work takes him to other than 
adjoining Canadian Provinces will be outside the Act. For 
example, an employee from New Brunswick might recover com­
pensation if injured while attending a convention in San Fran­
cisco, but not in Toronto, and maybe not in Charlottetown.
The same section further provides tihat if the employer does 
not include such workmen in the payroll which he supplies to
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the Compensation Board, the employer shall be individually 
liable for the payment of compensation. However, in such a 
case the employer can avoid that liability by showing that the 
workman was entitled to compensation in the adjoining Province 
or Country. Surely it would be more consistent with the nature 
of the Act for the Board to pay the injured workman compensa­
tion and the Board collect from the defaulting employer.
How does the position of fishermen fit into the Act? Fisher­
men certainly come within the Act,30 however, it would appear 
that if they are injured outside territorial waters they will be 
outside the Act. In this regard the Act seems deficient.
Injury or death in the course of employment within the 
scope of the Act may not entitle the workman or his dependants 
to compensation, for section 7(1) contains a general provision 
that “nothing in this part shall entitle any person not resident 
in New Brunswick to compensation payments \ It is not difficult 
to think of situations where this provision would work hardships, 
particularly from the standpoint of dependants. There are, 
however, two exceptions to this residence rule: (1) ‘The Board 
may upon application grant leave from time to time to any 
workman or dependent resident in New Brunswick at the time 
of the accident to reside out of New Brunswick without thereby 
forfeiting the right to compensation payments under this Part;”
(2) where by the laws of any other jurisdiction a New Brunswick 
resident could receive compensation if injured in such jurisdic­
tion, then a resident of that jurisdiction injured in New Bruns­
wick may be paid compensation. But an Order in Council must 
be passed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to the effect of 
the law in me foreign jurisdiction. This provision respecting an 
Order in Council seems to be a hangover from the pre-1918 Em­
ployer’s Liability Acts, but have for the most part disappeared. 
There is also a provision for reduction of compensation pay­
ments where the recipient is resident outside New Brunswick 
“according to the conditions and cost of living in the place of 
residence of such dependents”.
Assuming a workman comes sufficiently within the Act to be 
entitled to compensation, he will have no other remedy against 
his employer.31 However, there is an exception to this general 
rule where there is a claim or right of action against the em­
ployer “under or in virtue of any statute of Canada, or of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.”32 In 
such cases a workman can only claim as compensation the dif­
30. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, R.S.N.B., 1952, s. 2(2).
31. Ibid. s. 11
32. Ibid, s. 8.
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ference between the amount of such claim or right of action and 
what would otherwise be payable as full compensation, unless 
he releases the employer from any such claim or compensation.
It may seem at first glance that compensation claims should 
be in lieu of any other claim against the employer. But why? 
It was surely never the intention of the Legislature in providing 
for compensation to forgive an employer his negligence. Surely 
the whole purpose of the Act is to keep the injured employee 
from destitution where he has no other legal claim, and to give 
him some quick remedy pending settlement of any legal claim 
which if resisted by the employer may suffer considerable delay. 
I suggest it is more consistent with tne true purpose of a work­
men s compensation scheme to allow an employee, injured under 
circumstances which would ordinarily give him a right of action 
against his employer, the right to claim compensation and bring 
his action. Tne compensation could, of course, be taken into 
consideration to some extent in deciding the amount of damages.
The New Brunswick Act preserve? rights of action against 
persons other than employers.*3 The injured workman or the 
dependents of a deceased workman may either claim compensa­
tion or bring action. If action is brought and less is recovered 
than compensation, the difference may be claimed. If compen­
sation is claimed the Board shall be subrogated to the position 
of the workman or his dependents. The Act is silent on what 
happens if the Board, as subrogee, recovers from the third party 
more than the amount of compensation paid. Must it be paid 
to the workman, or part of it paid to him, or held in trust for 
him until such time as the final compensation payments are 
made? It should be remembered that the amounts of compen­
sation payments may be increased from time to time.
As was mentioned a workman injured by a negligent third 
party may either claim compensation or bring action. This might 
appear as if the injured employee is put to an election ana if 
he choses to take compensation he will loose his right of action, 
even if his claim is denied by the Workmens Compensation 
Board. That appears to have been the thinking of the majority 
of the Supreme Court of New Brunswick (Richards, C. J. and 
Hughes, J.) in Hart v. Rossignol.34 But that decision was re­
versed by the Supreme Court of Canada35 upholding the minority 
view of Michaua, C.J. K.B. that the Board’s denial of compen­
sation can have no effect in respect of an action taken against a 
third person.
33. Ibid, s. 9.
34. [1955] 2 D.L.R. 823.
35. Rossingol v. Hari (1956) S.C.R. 314; [1956] 1 D.L.R. (2d) 705.
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Section 10 of the Act provides that an injured workman has 
no right of action against any employer within the scope of the 
Act. However, the same provision does not apply to the de­
pendants of a deceased workman. Not only does s. 10 not men­
tion “dependants” but that very point was considered in the 
recent case of Delorey v. Wasson-3'  In that case all the parties 
involved were within the scope of the Act. Delorey was killed 
in an automobile collision due to the negligent operation of a 
Wasson Co. car by Wasson. Compensation was applied for and 
received by Delorey’s dependants. Then Delorey’s administrator 
brought action against Wasson and the Wasson Co. under the 
Fatal Accidents Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Board being 
joined as co-plaintiff. The trial judge dismissed the action 
against the Wasson Co. apparently misdirecting himself as re­
gards s. 10. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of New 
Brunswick. It was a happy day in the history of workmen’s 
compensation in New Brunswick when McNair, CJ.N .B. refused 
to allow existing rights of action to be abolished except by clear 
words in the Compensation Act, and held that, “S. 10 makes no 
mention of dependents and any restrictions arising from its pro­
visions clearly have no application to bar any of their rights.” 
It is to be regretted, however, that the Chief Justice did not take 
a stronger stand as to the positive interpretation of s. 10 for it 
was argued that s. 10 read in conjunction with s. 9(1) must be 
treated as a nullity. That argument by itself may have some 
validity, but when s. 9 and 10 are read in conjunction with the 
other provisions on compensation the intention of the legislature 
is all too clear. Although I may not agree with the provision, 
and with respect to the draftsman, the opening words of the 
s. 10 might read better as “No employer or workman within the 
scope of this Part may brin^ an action against any employer 
within the scope of this Part’.
The Act contains no other provisions as regards the scope 
of compensation. Particularly conspicious is the lack of a pro­
vision for reciprocal agreements with other legal jurisdictions. 
Most of the sections (about fifty) in Part I concern the constitu­
tion and jurisdiction of a Board, the establishment and adminis­
tration of an accident fund. Time will not permit a close analy­
sis of all those provisions, however, some mention of the Board 
and its jurisdictions is essential.
The Board consists of three members appointed by the 
Lieutenant-Governor in Council,37 two of whom constitute a 
quorum,38 and is vested with the widest powers. Its jurisdiction
36. (1960) 55 M.P.R. 356.
37. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, R.S.N.B., 1952, s. 17.
38. Ibid. s. 20.
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is far more sweeping than that of the Supreme Court of New 
Brunswick.39 When a claim for compensation is made the Board 
combines the roles of defendant, juage and jury as well as col­
lecting and administering the fund from which claims are paid 
when granted. This type of all-powerful judicial as well as 
administrative tribunal seems peculiar to Canada. It is a high 
tribute to Canadians that such tribunals operate satisfactorily — 
if they do. The Board is not bound by its own decisions,40 which 
are final and conclusive41 from which there is no appeal except 
on questions of jurisdiction and law.42 In Nagy v. Workmen’s 
Compensation Board,43 Hazen, C.J. said;
“It must have been the intention of the Legislature to 
leave as far as possible control in the hands of the N. B. 
W orkmen’s Compensation Board and prevent appeals 
being taken from their decision.”
Those words seem as applicable today as they were in 1931.
Powers of the Board may be delegated,44 and it was held by 
Harrison, J. in Touchie v. Workmen’s Compensation Board,45
that where a matter is referred to a committee of medical prac­
titioners under s. 32(5) such “review” means “determination \
It is specifically provided that the decision of the Board 
Shall be final and conclusive as to whether or not an injury 
exists.46 However, Rand, J., in the Supreme Court of Canada, 
specifically overruled Richards, C.J.N.B., and said that the exclu­
sive jurisdiction conferred upon the Workmen’s Compensation 
Board to determine, inter alia, the existenc of an injury cannot 
have effect in respect of an action of an injury against a third 
person.47 In that case, it will be remembered, the Board found 
there was no injury, but the Supreme Court of Canada allowed 
an action against a negligent third person. It mus be assumed 
the Court will apply similar reasoning in other places where the 
Board has exclusive jurisdiction.
39. Ibid. s. 29-34.
40. Ibid. s. 29
41. Ibid. s. 32(1',.
42. Ibid, s. 34(2)
43. (1931) 3 M.P.R. 516.
See Bathurst & Crosby v. Workmen's Compensation Board
(1928) 53 N.B.R. 455;
Workmen's Compensation Board v. St. John Tugboat Co.
(1931) 4 M.P.R. 9.
44. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, R.S.N.B., 1952, ss. 31, 32(5).
45. (1947) 20 M.P.R. 438; [1947] 4 D.L.R. 593.
46. The W orkmen’s Compensation Act, R.S.N.B., 1952, s. 32(2) (a).
47. Rossingol v. Hart [1956] S.C.R. 314; [1956] 1 D.L.R. (2d) 705.
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Since the case of R. v. Workmen’s Compensation Board of
N. B.,48 it appears settled that s. 42, empowering the Board to 
“reopen, rehear, redetermine, review or readjust any claim, de­
cision or adjustment,” deals with circumstances which follow the 
award of compensation and not with those which precede it. So 
when die Board, in that case, refused compensation on the 
ground that the injury did not arise out of the employment, 
Baxter, J. held the Board could not reopen the case and grant 
compensation. Although that may be a proper interpretation 
of s. 42, the result of the case seems hard to reconcile witn s. 32(3) 
and s. 32(2) (j) which would appear to expressly authorize the 
very thing the Board sought to do.
It cannot be doubted that the provisions of the New Bruns­
wick Workmen’s Compensation Act enable the Board to operate 
in quite an arbitrary manner, however, there seems to be great 
reluctanoe in the Courts to let the Board have the last word in 
anything. It is to be hoped that the Courts will continue this 
trend as regards s. 6(4) which provides in part as follows;
“W here the Board is of the opinion that a person entitled  
to compensation under this part is leading an immoral 
or improper life, the Board has the power, after due in­
vestigation, to withhold or suspend compensation for 
such a period as the Board deems proper;”
Sudh a Victorian provision in 20th century social legislation needs 
some comment. A nicer piece of Mrs. Grundyism can scarcely 
be found.
48. (1934) 8 M.P.R. 25; [1934] 3 D.L.R. 753.
